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I.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Proposition 21, the Rental Affordability Act, amends Cal. Civ. Codes §1954.50,
§1954.52, and §1954.53 to allow for cities or counties to enact rent control on residential
properties over fifteen years old.1 Under the proposed changes to existing law, after a
tenant moves out and there is vacancy in a rent-controlled unit, the landlord would be
limited to a rent increase of 15% over a span of three years from the start of a new
tenancy.2 However, these rent-control provisions would not apply to homes of individuals
who own more than two homes.3 If this initiative is passed, then the rent control provisions
above would replace the Costa-Hawkins Rental Control Act contained in those Cal. Civ.
Code sections.4
Supporters generally argue that rent control would help low-income renters to afford
other life necessities, and it would also assist in reducing environmental harm by enabling
people to afford to live where they work. The author’s purpose is to reduce homelessness
by reducing rents and, at the same time, incentivize developers to build more housing that
would not be subject to the fifteen-year threshold.5
Opponents argue that rent control is not the right solution to California’s housing
problem and that it would put unnecessary financial strain on state and local budgets,
which have already been negatively impacted by COVID-19. California’s Legislative
Analyst’s Office estimates the fiscal impact of enacting the rent-control provisions contained
in this initiative could result in the reduction of state and local revenue in the tens of millions
of dollars per year.6
A YES vote supports this initiative to allow city or county governments to enact rentcontrol measures on residential properties over fifteen years old.
A NO vote opposes this initiative, which means that the Costa-Hawkins Rental
Control Act would still limit a city or county government’s ability to enact rent-control
measures.
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II.

LAW
A. Existing Law
1.

History of Rent Control in the United States and in California

In the United States, Congress twice enacted legislation controlling rental rates on a
federal level.7 In 1942, Congress passed the Emergency Price Control Act, which set price
controls for “defense rental areas” when local controls were found to be inadequate.8 The
federal government feared that rising rents in certain industrial zones would put pressure on
wages and reduce the labor supply in these war production centers, thereby hindering the
war effort.9 In response, this federal statute was enacted for the purposes of stabilizing
prices and preventing irregular and unwarranted increases in rents in areas with a high
industrial output, and it expired on its own terms in 1947.10 Later, in 1970, Congress
authorized the Nixon administration to create regulations in order to stabilize prices, rents,
wages, and salaries during the Energy Crisis.11 Those regulations expired as well.12
The United States Supreme Court made its stance on rent control known in the 1985
case of Fisher v. City of Berkeley.13 The Supreme Court held that rent control is not
incompatible with the Sherman Act, which is a federal anti-monopoly and antitrust statute
that prohibits activities restricting interstate commerce and competition in the
marketplace.14 However, nothing in the opinion indicates that there is any barrier by federal
law to state regulation in this area.15 Therefore, with the exception of the pieces of
legislation passed in 1942 and 1970, and in the absence of further Congressional action,
the regulation of rent in the United States is an issue for each state to confront.16
In California, there are several examples of rent control or rental stabilization. The
first occurred in Berkeley in 1972, when voters passed a rent-control charter amendment via
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the initiative process.17 Landlords challenged this amendment in court, where it was held
that the Berkeley law was procedurally unconstitutional.18 California courts have also
consistently held that rent control laws must not infringe on a landlord’s right to “fair return”
on their investment.19 The California Constitution confers regulatory power over rents to the
cities and counties as an exercise of the state’s police power.20 A city’s police power is
subject to state law, and under this provision, a city can exercise its police power only
within its own territory. Otherwise, a city’s police power is as broad as the power held by
the state legislature.21 By 1980, 14 cities in California had some form of rent control. Today,
there are 19 cities in the state that have enacted some form of localized rent control.22
2. Costa-Hawkins Rental Control Act
There were ten attempts by the state legislature to enact limitations on locally
enacted rent control before the passage of the Costa-Hawkins Rental Control Act in 1995.
Several forces converged in order to allow that legislation to pass. A combination of
Republicans taking control of the Assembly, and the election of Republican Governor Pete
Wilson, resulted in the legislature’s first successful passage of a limitation on rent control.
In light of these political changes, Costa-Hawkins moved easily through the
legislature. In April 1995, the bill passed the Senate Judiciary Committee 5–2; in May 1995,
the bill passed out of the Senate 22–14; in June 1995, the bill passed the Assembly Housing
Community Development Committee 6–2, and the Assembly Appropriations Committee 10–
7.23 On July 24, 1995, the Senate and Assembly passed the Costa-Hawkins bill by 24–11 and
45–18, respectively.24 Governor Pete Wilson signed the measure, AB 1164, into law in early
August, and it went into effect on January 1, 1996.25
Costa-Hawkins limited localized rent control in California by prohibiting rent control
rules from applying to housing first occupied on or after February 1, 1995, and single-family
homes.26 While cities and counties retain the ability to implement their own local rent
control, they are required to follow the regulations listed in Costa-Hawkins.27 The legislation
17

Jonathan M. Ross, Comment, California Rent Control as Applied: Assessed Value as a Measure of Fair
Return, 27 Santa Clara L. Rev. 715 (1987) at 718.
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Cal. Const., art. XI, § 7.
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Stanislaus Co. etc. Assn. v. Stanislaus, 8 Cal. 2d 378, 383-384 (1937).
Kenneth H. Carlson, Cities with Rent Control, The Renters’ Rights Online Legal Help Clinic (2020), available
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at https://caltenantlaw.com/cities-with-rent-control/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2020).
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Mantel, Henry and Silveria, Sebastian (2018) “Proposition 10: Affordable Housing Act,” California Initiative
Review (CIR): Vol. 2018, Article 10, available at https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/california-initiativereview/vol2018/iss1/10/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2020).
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Letter from Ashley Johansson, to Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, State of California (December 12, 2017),
available at https://lao.ca.gov/ballot/2017/170629.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2020).
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mandates that local rent-control rules allow landlords the freedom to set market rates when
transitioning between tenants.28 Further, any housing that was exempt from local rent-control
rules at the time Costa-Hawkins passed must remain exempt.29
3. Statutory Language of Costa-Hawkins
The text of the Costa-Hawkins Rental Control Act is located within the California Civil
Code, at §§ 1954.50–1954.535.30 The intent behind this legislation was that it would act as a
more moderate approach to some of the more extreme vacancy-control ordinances that
were operative in cities such as Berkeley, Santa Monica, East Palo Alto, and West
Hollywood.31 The passage of Costa-Hawkins imposed three primary limitations. First, rent
control cannot apply to any single-family homes.32 Second, rent control can never apply to
any housing completed on or after February 1, 1995, because the housing is considered to
be newly constructed.33 Third, rent-control laws cannot dictate to landlords what rates they
can charge a new tenant when first moving in.34
No law can interfere with the owner’s ability to set the rental rate for their property if
that property was constructed after February 1, 1995, exempted from rent control prior to
that date, or is a single-family home or condominium.35
However, there are exceptions to the owner’s ability to establish the rental rate.
Specifically, an owner loses that ability if they terminate the tenancy with a 30-day or 60-day
notice,36 if the owner agrees to a government contract for that rate,37 if the owner fails to
renew a government contract,38 or if the housing is deemed substandard.39
Lawmakers included provisions authorizing local cities and communities to enforce
eviction rules,40 provisions for subleases,41 contractual relationships,42 protections for tenants
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Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1954.50-1954.535.
Cal. Legislative Analyst’s Office. Proposition 10 Expands Local Governments’ Authority to Enact Rent Control
on Residential Property. Initiative Statute. (Nov. 6, 2018), available at https://lao.ca.gov/ballot/2018/prop10110618.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2020).
31
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Cal. Civ. Code § 1954.52(a)(1-3).
Id. § 1954.53(a)(1).
Id. § 1954.52(b), 1954.53(a)(2).
Id. § 1954.53(a)(1).
Id. § 1954.53(f).
Id. § 1954.52(c), 1954.53(e).
Id. § 1954.53(d)(1-4).
Id. § 1954.53(d)(1).
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on renewal of a lease,43 and regulations requiring a 90-day notice when owners terminate
a government contract.44
4. Proposition 10 and the Tenant Protection Act
Proposition 10 was a measure on the ballot in 2018 and would have repealed the
entirety of Costa-Hawkins by removing §§ 1954.50–53 of the California Civil Code. It would
have repealed the limits on local rent-control laws, thereby allowing cities and counties to
limit how much a landlord may increase rent when a new tenant moves in.45 Proposition 10
itself would not have made any changes to local rent-control laws and would have had no
impact on the requirement that a property owner be allowed a “fair rate of return” as
dictated by past court rulings.46
However, voters made it clear that they were uninterested in a wholesale repeal of
Costa-Hawkins; Proposition 10 lost by a 59.4% vote against versus a 40.6% vote in favor.
Almost one year later, on October 8, 2019, Governor Gavin Newsom signed the
Tenant Protection Act into law.47 The measure has two major impacts on landlords and
tenants of residential property in the state: (1) it imposes a percentage limit on the
maximum annual rent increase, capped at 5% of the gross rental rate plus the change in
cost of living, which is not to exceed 10% in total; and (2) it introduces a requirement that
tenants may only be evicted for “just cause” if they have occupied a property for at least
twelve months.48 The measure does not apply to housing that has been issued a certificate
of occupancy in the last fifteen years, school dormitories, or owner-occupied single-family
homes and duplexes.49
There are several key differences between the Tenant Protection Act of 2019 and the
changes that Proposition 21 would implement. First, the act does not amend any section of
Costa-Hawkins, instead amending sections 1946.2, 1947.12, and 1947.13 of the Civil Code.50
Second, the legislation caps the annual rent increase at 10% over the course of a single
year, where Proposition 21 would cap the annual rent increase at 15% over a three-year
period.51 For example, under the act, an owner of residential real property could raise rents
43
44

Id. § 1954.53(b).
Id. § 1954.535.
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Mantel, Henry and Silveria, Sebastian (2018) “Proposition 10: Affordable Housing Act,” California Initiative
Review (CIR): Vol. 2018, Article 10, available at https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/california-initiativereview/vol2018/iss1/10/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2020).
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Timothy Hutter, Governor Newsom Signs Tenant Protection Act of 2019: What Residential Landlords Need to
Know About the Capped Rent Increases and New Eviction Protocols, The National Law Review (October 27,
2019), available at https://www.natlawreview.com/article/governor-newsom-signs-tenant-protection-act-2019what-residential-landlords-need-to (last visited Oct. 4, 2020).
48

Id.
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Cal. Civ. Code § 1946.2(e)(1-8)
Id. § 1946.2, 1947.12, 1947.13.
Id. § 1947.12(a)(1).

50
51

5

at a rate of as much as 10% per year, which could result in a rate increase of as much as
30% over three years. An increase of that size is twice what would be permissible under
Proposition 21 for a new tenant. Lastly, the Tenant Protection Act is only in place until
January 1, 2030.52
B. Proposed Law
1. Changes to 1954.50 of the California Civil Code
The title of the sections of the Civil Code spanning from section 1954.50 through
section 1954.535 will change from the “Costa-Hawkins Rental Control Act” to the “Rental
Affordability Act.”53
2. Changes to 1954.52 of the California Civil Code
Instead of exempting housing first occupied after February 1, 1995, only housing first
occupied within the last fifteen years of the date from which the owner seeks to set the
rental rate would be exempt.54 Further, the blanket exemption from rental control for
property that was already exempt on or before February 1, 1995 is completely eliminated.55
Lastly, while the exemption for single-family homes and condominiums remains in place, it
is only effective if the owner is a natural person that owns no more than two residential
dwelling or housing units.56
Proposition 21 will also codify what California courts consistently hold: that a
landlord’s right of fair return on a property shall not be infringed upon by any local charter
provision, ordinance, or regulation enacted by a city or county.57
3. Changes to 1954.53 of the California Civil Code
Aside from the exceptions outlined in section 1954.52, Proposition 21 will allow a city
or county to control initial and subsequent rental rates for residential property by way of
local charter provision, ordinance, or regulation. As a result, many of the specific
exemptions listed in the existing law within section 1954.53 are eliminated, in favor of only
including those exemptions listed in 1954.52.

52
53

Id. § 1946.2(j), 1947.12(j), 1947.13(c).
Cal. Proposition 21 (2020), available at https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/19-

0001%20%28Rental%20Affordability%20Act%29.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2020).
54
Cal. Legislative Analyst’s Office, Proposition 21 Expands Local Governments’ Authority to Enact Rent Control
on Residential Property. Initiative Statute. (November 3, 2020), available at
https://lao.ca.gov/ballot/2020/Prop21-110320.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2020).
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The most significant change within this section is the limitations placed on rent
increases for rent-controlled properties at the start of a new tenancy. This increase is
capped at 15% over the course of the first three years of the new tenancy, calculated in
addition to any increase permitted by local charter provision, ordinance, or regulation.58
Hypothetically, if a new tenant moves into a building, and the initial rental rate is set at
1000 dollars per month, then over the course of the first three years, the rent could rise no
higher than 1150 dollars per month. This is in contrast to the current permitted 10% increase
annually, which could result in the same tenant seeing a rent of 1100 dollars per month by
the end of the first year alone, and significantly higher than that by the end of the same
three-year period.
It is crucial to note that Proposition 21 will not in itself make any changes to local
rent-control laws – it merely allows cities and counties to dictate rent control on a more
local basis, with less interference from state law.
III.

DRAFTING ISSUES
A. Severability

Section 9 of Proposition 21, generally referred to as a “severability clause,” allows
any part of the act to be severed from the rest of the measure if the language of the
statute, or its application, are deemed invalid. The existence of a severability clause
establishes the presumption in favor of severance.59 Courts in California apply three criteria
when determining if a provision can be severed: “the invalid provision must be
grammatically, functionally, and volitionally severable.”60 In the event that any section of
Proposition 21 is held invalid, it will be severed from the rest of the measure if the following
three statements are true: the rest of the measure makes sense grammatically; the rest of
the measure can be implemented on its own; and the electorate would have voted for the
initiative even if the invalid section had not been included in the measure. If these criteria
are not met, then the court may invalidate the measure in its entirety.61
The first key aspect of this measure mainly takes the form of adding and repealing
various exemptions to rent control. If one of the added exemptions is found to be improper,
or one of the repealed exemptions is found to have been improperly removed, the
remaining exemptions can exist on their own. Their removal will not render the code
sections grammatically insensible, and the loss of one exemption or another will still allow
the rest of the measure to be implemented.
The second key aspect of this measure – that rent increases for a new tenancy be
capped at 15% over the course of the first three years – is separate from the listed
58

Id.
Cal. Redevelopment Ass’n v. Matosantos, 53 Cal. 4th 231, 270 (2011).
60
Id.
61
Id.
59

7

exemptions, and so the changes to § 1954.52 and § 1954.53 of the Civil Code can occur
independent of each other. While the result if one or more provisions were severed would
not necessarily be the reform to Costa-Hawkins that the proponents of Proposition 21
intended, the result would still be a partial expansion of the authority to enact rent control
to cities that adopt rent-control measures, and so the electorate’s interests in voting for the
measure would likely be satisfied. Therefore, if one of the sections of Proposition 21 is held
invalid by the courts, that section will likely be considered severable, leaving the rest of the
measure intact.
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
A. United States Constitutional Issues

The United States Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause prevents
the government from enacting legislation that lacks a reasonable relation to a proper
legislative purpose.62 The Supreme Court of California interpreted this to mean that rentcontrol ordinances must be “reasonably calculated to provide landlords with a just and
reasonable return on their property.”63 Therefore, if an ordinance does not allow landlords
a just or reasonable return on their property then it is confiscatory, unconstitutional, and thus
invalid.64 In general, the Supreme Court of California is hesitant to decide rent-control cases
because an issuance of an opinion can leave the “reviewing court the impossible task of
finding somewhere in the penumbra of the Constitution a stipulation that a particular
apartment in a particular building should rent for $746 per month rather than $745.”65
The burden falls on the landlord to challenge a rent control law that does not allow
a just or reasonable return.66 If the rent-control ordinance is determined to be
unconstitutional, then the city or county government has to adjust future rents to a rate that
will reasonably compensate landlords in the future.67 In order to determine whether rentcontrol prices offer a just or reasonable return to landlords, courts do an analysis which
balances the consumer’s interests against the investor’s interests.68 Included within the
balancing analysis is whether the rent-control law allows the city or county to adjust prices
“within a broad zone of reasonableness” but not to the extent that would prevent effective
real estate enterprises from “operating successfully.”69
If this proposition is passed, it would face legal challenges from Californian
landlords. First, a city or county government would have to adopt the rent-control measures
62

Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 550 P.2d 1001 (Cal. 1976); Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 941

P.2d 851 (Cal. 1997).
63

Id.
Galland v. City of Clovis, 16 P.3d 130 (Cal. 2001), as modified (Mar. 21, 2001).
65
Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 941 P.2d 851 (Cal. 1997).
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Galland v. City of Clovis, 16 P.3d 130 (Cal. 2001).
69
Id.
64
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from the proposition, which state voters have already passed into law. Next, after a
landlord has incurred enough losses to prove that their ability to raise rent, being restricted
to 15% over the span of three years at the start of a new tenancy, did not allow them to
make a just or reasonable return, then a they would bring a lawsuit against the city or
county. An important note, applying to a landlord’s ability to recover, is that a “a
constitutional injury does not occur simply because a government regulation limits the value
of property.”70 If the rent-control provision is found to be unconstitutional because it does
not allow landlords a just or reasonable return, then the court could order the city or county
government to adjust the provision to allow for landlords to be reasonably compensated in
the future. After the city or county has adjusted its rent-control ordinance, then the landlord
would have to prove that, even after this adjustment, they could not obtain a “fair return” on
their property because of the continued rent control.71
Landlords have also challenged rent-control ordinances in other states under the
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.72 This clause states that private property shall not “be
taken for public use, without just compensation.”73 A recent U.S. Supreme Court decision
recognized that property owners may bring Fifth Amendment claims for compensation in
federal court without first getting a ruling in state court.74 This case overturned the previous
requirement that property owners bringing a Fifth Amendment claim would have to receive
a decision from state court before proceeding to litigation in federal court.75 With this
impactful decision, it is expected that the number of landlords who will attempt to bring
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause claims in federal court, against local or state rent-control
laws, will increase.76 If that is true, then federal court circuits may develop their own rent
control tests. Therefore, the future of rent control, as a policy, is uncertain and federal court
decisions may dictate any new developments.
V.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
A. Arguments for Proposition 21

Proponents generally cite statewide statistics to support their arguments that rent
control helps improve rent affordability, prevent homelessness, and reduce environmental
harm.

70

Hillsboro Properties v. City of Rohnert Park, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 441 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 2006).
Id.
72
Luis Ferre-Sadurni, Landlords Strick Back, Suing to Dismantle Rent Regulation System (July 16, 2019),
available at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/16/nyregion/ny-rent-regulation-lawsuit.html (last visited Oct. 5,
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2020).
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U.S. Const. amend. V.
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Knick v. Township of Scott, Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019).
Id.
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Luis Ferre-Sadurni, Landlords Strick Back, Suing to Dismantle Rent Regulation System (July 16, 2019),
available at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/16/nyregion/ny-rent-regulation-lawsuit.html (last visited Oct. 5,
75
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First, proponents argue that this proposition would assist the many Californians who
are renters.77 According to California’s Department of Housing and Community
Development, of California’s six million renter households, one in three renters pays more
than 50% of their income toward rent.78 In addition, home ownership in California is the
lowest it has been since the 1940s.79 A 2018 USC study found that implementation of rent
control to this renter population could protect tenants from price gouging while also being
simple to administer by local governments.80 Prior studies demonstrates that long-term
tenants living in rent-controlled units “receive considerable benefits by paying substantially
less than what would otherwise be the case.”81 In sum, populations who are unable to pay
rent could gain social benefits, which are difficult to quantify, because of the money they
would retain by living in a rent-controlled unit.82
Second, proponents associate high rent prices with an increasing number of
homeless people in California.83 A 2018 UCLA study’s title sums up this argument as “People
Are Simply Unable to Pay Rent.”84 This study conducted an overview of Los Angeles’s rentcontrol history which has been characterized by a continual inflation of rent prices since the
1940s.85 The number of affordable housing units, covered under Los Angeles’s Rental
Stabilization Ordinance, has decreased despite the population of Los Angeles increasing.86
At the time of this study in 2018, there were 53,000 homeless people in the county of Los
Angeles.87 A report from California’s Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO) states that, as of
2019, there are a total of 151,000 people experiencing homelessness in California.88 While
the LAO admits that most legislative proposals addressing homelessness have occurred on
the local level, the LAO asserts that the state still contributes to resolving the problem
through the administering of various grant programs to developers or landlords. Lastly, the

77

Cal. Proposition 21 (2020), available at https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/190001%20%28Rental%20Affordability%20Act%29.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2020).
78
Cal. Dep’t Hous. & Cmty. Dev., California's Housing Future: Challenges And Opportunities (Feb. 2018),
available at https://hcd.ca.gov/policy-research/plans-reports/docs/sha_final_combined.pdf (last visited Oct. 4,
2020).
79
Id.
80
Pastor, Carter, and Abood, Rent Matters: What are the Impacts of Rent Stabilization Measures? (Oct. 2018),
available at https://dornsife.usc.edu/assets/sites/242/docs/Rent_Matters_PERE_Report_Web.pdf (last visited
Oct. 4, 2020).
81
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Cal. Proposition 21 (2020), available at https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/190001%20%28Rental%20Affordability%20Act%29.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2020).
84
Belinkoff Katz, “People Are Simply Unable to Pay the Rent” What History Tells Us About Rent Control in Los
Angeles (Oct. 2018), available at https://luskincenter.history.ucla.edu/wpcontent/uploads/sites/66/2018/09/People-Are-Simply-Unable-to-Pay-the-Rent.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2020).
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Cal. Legislative Analyst’s Office, Proposition 21 Expands Local Governments’ Authority to Enact Rent Control
on Residential Property. Initiative Statute. (November 3, 2020), available at
https://lao.ca.gov/ballot/2020/Prop21-110320.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2020).
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UCLA study recommends repealing the Costa-Hawkins Act in order to address the
homelessness crisis.89
Third, proponents argue that high rent forces people to live further away from their
workplace and results in environmental harm from the longer commute.90 Californians
average a 29.3-minute commute, which is the fifth longest in the United States.91 A 2018 UC
Berkeley policy brief argued that workers without stable housing are susceptible to
increased difficulties in finding and keeping a job.92 As a result, these workers are forced to
live in areas outside of cities, although cities have the most jobs, so they are forced into
long commutes through use of private vehicles.93 An increased commute time is directly
related to an increased amount of harmful greenhouse gases being released into the
environment from these vehicles.94 Even with the COVID-19 pandemic causing many people
to work from home, Pew Research Center cites data that working from home is only an
option for the highest positions in the most affluent professions.95 Thus, people who are not
in these professions must still do in-person work, which necessitates them using some mode
of transportation to get there.96 If people could afford to live near where they worked, then
environmental harm would be decreased because traffic congestion would be reduced.
B. Proponent’s Coalition
There are a variety of organizations who are supporting this proposition which was
financed by the AIDS Healthcare Foundation.97 Individuals such as U.S. Senator Bernie
Sanders, U.S. Congressperson Maxine Waters, U.S. Congressperson Barbara Lee, President
pro Tempore of the California Senate Kevin de Leon, and Reverend Al Sharpton all support
this initiative.98 The California Democratic Party is among the most prominent organizations
89

Belinkoff Katz, “People Are Simply Unable to Pay the Rent” What History Tells Us About Rent Control in Los
Angeles (Oct. 2018), available at https://luskincenter.history.ucla.edu/wpcontent/uploads/sites/66/2018/09/People-Are-Simply-Unable-to-Pay-the-Rent.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2020).
90
Cal. Proposition 21 (2020), available at https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/190001%20%28Rental%20Affordability%20Act%29.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2020).
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to endorse a yes vote on this proposition.99 Other supportive organizations include Housing
Now! California, National Organization of Black County Officials, and AFSCME California
PEOPLE.100 The Los Angeles Times’ editorial board, in support, states that, “Rent control can
be a helpful tool for cities struggling with gentrification, displacement and homelessness in
a booming real estate market.”101
C. Arguments Against Proposition 21
Opponents generally argue that rent control will not fix California’s housing problem,
and that the state needs to create other innovative solutions. Additionally, they cite how the
passage of this proposition would lead to a substantial loss in tax revenue for governments
and lead to renters being more significantly disadvantaged than they are now.
First, opponents cite how nearly 60% of California voters rejected Proposition 10, the
previous form of Proposition 21, in 2018.102 The argument is; because voters rejected a
similar proposition, voters should be consistent and reject this one too.103 The OC Register
sums up this position, “Voters rejected a similar measure two years ago by a significant
margin. But once again, they are being presented a measure predicated on the fallacy that
rent control is a good policy.”104 Simply put, opponents do not think that rent control works
because it is an example of a “price ceiling,” which kills incentives to build more housing,
causes landlords to neglect maintenance, and inflates prices for non-rent-controlled units.105
Instead of implementing rent control which amounts to excessive regulation, local
lawmakers could reform local zoning laws instead.106
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Second, opponents argue that the loss of tax revenue would be devastating,
especially with the COVID-19 pandemic restricting budgets.107 California’s LAO estimates
that tens of millions of dollars per year, in the form of lessened property, sales, and income
tax revenues, could be lost for state and local governments.108 The value in rental properties
will go down, which will cause a decrease in property and income taxes paid by
landlords.109 These lost costs would most likely “be paid by fees on owners of rental
housing” in an attempt to make up some lost revenue.110 Additionally, rent-control policies
necessitate local governments expand their rent oversight boards which would result in
increased costs of operation.111 Overall, “most economists – left or right – think rent control
is bad.”112
Third, low to middle class renters who may be seniors, veterans, or disabled are
offered no protections under this rent-control policy.113 An analysis by the California
Apartment Association concludes that rent control policies are not a solution to a housing
crisis because low-income individuals are not motivated to move out of their rent controlled
units while non-rent-controlled units increase in price to make up lost costs.114 If fewer
people move out of their rent controlled units, then “the supply of available units can
actually contract.”115 Lastly, a limitation on how much a landlord may increase rent could
lead to a disincentive for them to maintain their units in hopes of making up some of the
lost revenues.116
D. Opponent’s Coalition
The Californians for Responsible Housing leads the “No on Prop 21” campaign and
has united a wide range of individuals and organizations against rent control.117 The most
prominent individual is Governor Newsom, who is against this proposition because of the
recent passage of AB 1482, which caps annual rent increases at 5% plus inflation for
tenants, up to a maximum of 10%.118 Organizations who oppose include The California
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Chamber of Commerce, The Congress of California Seniors, The OC Register, and many
other veteran’s and trade groups.119
VI.

CONCLUSION

Proposition 21 lifts statewide restrictions on the ability of city and county
governments to implement rent control at a time when rising costs of living bear down on
Californians to a greater extent than at any other time in history. Rising rents, coupled with
economic hardship wrought by COVID-19, have pushed many renters into a position where
they are forced to choose between paying rent or providing for their families. If pushed into
homelessness, these hardships compounded exponentially.
Similarly, the rising costs of living have an impact on owners and landlords.
Proposition 21 seeks to address those concerns while simultaneously giving local politicians
the power to address the housing concerns of their constituents as needed. Ultimately, the
voters will need to decide what level of priority to give to the issue of rental affordability in
November.
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